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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
CLIENT REPRESENTATION-
A RE-EVALUATION
The American Bar Association has recently adopted a new
Code of Professional Responsibility, a statement of the ethical re-
sponsibilities for the practicing attorney.' Within the near future,
the California Legislature or the State Bar Association can adopt
or endorse all or part of the new ABA Code. Such action would
have a substantial effect on the California legal profession because
this would determine whether the ABA Code will have binding legal
effect or will be merely an advisory standard. To date the ABA's
Canons of Professional Ethics, which the Code replaces, have been
merely an advisory standard in California.
The American Bar Association adopted the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics in 1908.2 The ABA Canons discussed a lawyer's duties
to his client, the courts, his fellow attorneys and the public at large.
Over the years, the ABA amended the Canons several times, but
some lawyers still found them inadequate as a useful guide for de-
fining their responsibilities.
In the meantime, California codified the State Bar Act of 19271
to regulate the practice of law in California. This act includes three
provisions intended to define a lawyer's responsibilities: first, a list
of his duties to the profession and his clients,' second, an oath to
carry out his duties to the best of his knowledge and abilities' and
third, an authorization for the State Bar's Board of Governors to
formulate Rules of Professional Conduct subject to approval by
the state supreme court.' In the later formulation of these Rules
of Professional Conduct, the California State Bar Board of Gov-
ernors "commended" the ABA's Canons of Ethics to the members
of the State Bar.7 Thus the ABA Canons have had no legal effect
in California beyond "commendation."
1 ABA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBULITY (1969) [hereinafter referred to
and cited as ABA CODE].
2 ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETImcs (1908).
3 Cal. Stats. 1927, ch. 34, at 38 (1927), as amended CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 6000-6154 (West 1962).
4 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (West 1962).
5 Id. § 6067.
6 Id. § 6076.
7 "Rule 1 . . . . The specification in these rules of certain conduct as unprofes-
sional is not to be interpreted as an approval of conduct not specifically mentioned.
In that connection the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association are com-
mended to the members of the State Bar." Id.
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In 1969 the American Bar Association voted to replace its
Canons of Ethics. The new Code of Professional Responsibility is
the result of five year's work by the Association's Special Committee
on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, whose purpose was to examine
the Canons and recommend changes. The Committee found that the
Canons needed revision in four ways: first, they either omitted or
only partially covered important aspects of professional conduct,
second, many Canons, though substantially sound, needed editorial
revision, third, most of the Canons did not lend themselves to prac-
tical sanctions for violation, fourth, some of the Canons were ob-
solete due to changing conditions in the profession.8 After exhaustive
study, the Committee concluded that further amendment of the
present Canons was unsatisfactory. Modern conditions demanded
a modern Code of Professional Responsibility.
The ABA is now seeking adoption of the entire new Code by
appropriate state agencies. In California, the ABA's Code of Re-
sponsibility could be incorporated into the Business and Professions
Code by the Legislature, formulated as Rules of Professional Con-
duct by the State Bar Board of Governors and the Supreme Court
of California, or merely commended to the members of the Califor-
nia Bar as the present Canons of Ethics are now commended.'
Before either the legislature or the State Bar takes action on
the Code, its provisions should be carefully evaluated. The ABA
Code includes nine Canons which are broad statements of prin-
ciples governing all aspects of the legal profession. Each Canon is
accompanied by several objectives to which every lawyer should
aspire. These objectives are the Ethical Considerations. Each Canon
also includes a set of minimum standards of conduct which are to
effect the aims of the Canon. These standards are the Disciplinary
Rules. The ABA anticipates that the regulatory bodies of each State
Bar will apply these standards of conduct to disciplinary actions
undertaken in their jurisdictions.
This comment seeks to establish a method of evaluating the
ABA Code's Disciplinary Rules in light of the already existing
California provisions, violation of which can result in suspension,
disbarment or reproval of attorneys. Although California gave no
legal effect to the old ABA Canons, the new ABA Code may contain
worthwhile additions to or modifications of California's substantive
law concerning attorneys.
8 ABA CODE, at v.
9 The essential choice in California is between giving the ABA Code the force of
a substantive rule of discipline (legislative enactments and enactments by the State
Bar Board of Governors are enforced in the same manner) and giving the Code the
status of an advisory standard.
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Disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are presently within
the jurisdiction of the California State Bar Board of Governors and
the state supreme court. The supreme court, by statutory procedure,
may suspend or disbar an attorney for any of the following causes:1°
conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude,"
disobedience of an order of the court,' 2 violation of his oath or statu-
tory duties,1" wilfully appearing without authority as attorney for
a party to an action,' 4 lending his name as attorney to a non-attor-
ney' 5 or commission of any act involving mortal turpitude, dis-
honesty or corruption.' 6
As an alternative procedure, the California State Bar Board
of Governors may hold a hearing on any of the above causes or
establish disciplinary boards to hold such hearings subject to review
by the supreme court of the state.' 7 In addition, the Board of Gov-
ernors or its disciplinary boards may recommend to the state su-
preme court that an attorney be suspended from practice for any
wilful breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct.' 8 They may also
discipline members of the State Bar by public or private reproval.' 9
The new ABA Code makes no recommendations as to disciplin-
ary procedures; instead, its proposals are aimed at the substantive
reasons for which an attorney may be disciplined. The Code's Rules,
found in Canon 7, which deal with the lawyer's rights and obliga-
tions during the course of representation have been chosen for an
evaluation based on a comparison with present California law.
Canon 7 has been selected because in the course of representation
the lawyer must attain the legitimate aims of his client through
legally acceptable procedures, procedures which are sometimes mys-
tifying to the client. Witness one judge's opinion:
The lay litigant enters a temple of mysteries whose ceremonies are
dark, complex and unfathomable. Pretrial procedures are the cabalistic
rituals of the lawyers and judges .... The layman knows nothing of
their tactical significance .... He does know this much: that several
10 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6100 (West 1962).
11 Id. § 6101.
12 Id. § 6103.
's Id.
14 Id. § 6104.
15 Id. § 6105.
16 Id. § 6106.
17 "Method as alternative and cumulative. In their relation to the provisions
S.. concerning the disciplinary authority of the courts, the provisions of this article
[concerning the disciplinary authority of the State Bar's Board of Governors] provide
a complete alternative and cumulative method of hearing and determining accusations
against members of the State Bar." Id. § 6075.
18 Id. § 6078.
19 Id. § 6077.
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years frequently elapse between the commencement and trial of law-
suits. Since the law imposes this state of puzzled patience on the litigant,
it should permit him to sit back in peace and confidence without suspi-
cious inquiries and without incessant checking on counsel. 20
In order to inspire the trust and confidence of clients, the profession
must insure through its disciplinary measures that each client may
expect an attorney to fulfill his professional obligations. The ten
Disciplinary Rules of Canon 7 are designed to facilitate that aim.
As pointed out above, this comment seeks to evaluate the Dis-
ciplinary Rules of Canon 7 as possible additions to or modifications
of California law. The method employed here is an analytical com-
parison between the Rules and the present California law. All of the
Rules for ABA Canon 7 are not susceptible to this method of eval-
uation. For example, California has not decided whether disciplinary
action would be proper against an attorney who is wholly or par-
tially responsible for the release of prejudicial publicity in a crim-
inal case. Yet Disciplinary Rule 7-107 of the new ABA Code sets
forth a ten point set of rules concerning an attorney's relations with
the news media. In this area, then, comparison would be a poor form
of evaluation because California has had no experience with the
substantive procedures laid out in the Rule; this comment does no
more than point out the scope of the problem.
Similarly, comparison is a poor form of evaluation when two
rules are nearly identical. With only slight additions, the ABA Com-
mittee which drafted the Code of Professional Responsibility pat-
terned the Rules governing a lawyer's contact with witnesses and
judicial officers after two California Bar Rules of Professional Con-
duct. These Disciplinary Rules are not considered.
This comment examines the first six Disciplinary Rules of ABA
Canon 7, and makes recommendations for official action in three
alternative forms: First, the ABA Rule is so much better a state-
ment of the principle under discussion that the Legislature should
amend the Business and Professions Code to include the ABA pro-
vision. Second, the ABA Rule adds an important dimension which
should be adopted by the State Bar Board of Governors as a Rule
of Professional Conduct for approval by the state supreme court.
Third, the ABA Disciplinary Rule should merely be commended
to the members of the California Bar as an advisory standard, as
are the present ABA Canons. These recommendations are the result
of the following analytic comparison.
20 Daley v. County of Butte, 227 Cal. App. 2d 380, 392, 38 Cal. Rptr. 693, 700
(1964).
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"Canon 7 A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously
within the Bounds of the Law"
DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 7-101 Representing a Client Zealously.
(A) A lawyer should not intentionally:
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client
through reasonably available means permitted by
law and the Disciplinary Rules, except as provided
by DR 7-101 (B). A lawyer does not violate this Dis-
ciplinary Rule, however, by acceding to reasonable
requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice
the rights of his client, by being punctual in fulfill-
ing all professional committments, by avoiding
offensive tactics, or by treating with courtesy and
consideration all persons involved in the legal
process.
(2) Fail to carry out a contract of employment entered
into with a client for professional services, but he
may withdraw as permitted under DR 2-110,21 DR
5-102,22 and DR 5-105.23
21 ABA CODE, DR 2-110, at 28. Withdrawal from Employment.
(A) In general.
(1) If permission for withdrawal from employment is required by the rules
of a tribunal, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment in a pro-
ceeding before that tribunal without its permission.
(2) In any event, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he
has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of
his client, including giving due notice to his client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all matter and
property to which the client is entitled, and complying with applicable
laws and rules.
(3) A lawyer who withdraws from employment shall refund promptly any
part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned.
(B) Mandatory withdrawal.
A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission if re-
required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment, and a lawyer repre-
senting a client in other matters shall withdraw from employment if:
(1) He knows or it is obvious that his client is bringing the legal action,
conducting the defense, or asserting a position in the litigation, or is
otherwise having steps taken for him, merely for the purpose of harass-
ing or maliciously injuring any person.
(2) He knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result
in violation of a Disciplinary Rule.
(3) His mental or physical condition renders it unreasonably difficult for
him to carry out the employment effectively.
(4) He is discharged by his client.
(C) Permissive withdrawal.
1969] COMMENTS 117
If DR 2-110 (B) is not applicable, a lawyer may not request permission to
withdraw in matters pending before a tribunal, and may not withdraw in
other matters, unless such request or such withdrawal is because:
(1) His client:
(a) Insists upon prosecuting a claim or defense that is not warranted
under existing law and cannot be supported by good faith argument
for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.(b) Personally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct.(c) Insists that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct that is illegal or
that is prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules.(d) By other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer
to carry out his employment effectively.(e) Insists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the lawyer
engage in conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice of
the lawyer but not prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules.(f) Deliberately disregards an agreement or obligation to the lawyer as
to expenses or fees.(2) His continued employment is likely to result in a violation of a Disciplin-
ary Rule.(3) His inability to work with co-counsel indicates that the best interests of
the client likely will be served by withdrawal.(4) His mental or physical condition renders it difficult for him to carry out
the employment effectively.(5) His client knowingly and freely assents to termination of his employment.(6) He believes in good faith, in a proceeding pending before a tribunal,
that the tribunal will find the existence of other good cause for with-
drawal.22 Id., DR 5-102, at 64. Withdrawal as Counsel When the Lawyer Becomes a
Witness.
(A) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a
lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be
called as a witness on behalf of his client, he shall withdraw from the con-duct of the trial and his firm, if any, shall not continue representation in
the trial, except that he may continue the representation and he or a lawyerin his firm may testify in the circumstances enumerated in DR 5-101 (B)(1) through (4).(B) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a
lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm may be called as
a witness other than on behalf of his client, he may continue the representa-
tion until it is apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his
client.23 Id., DR 5-105, at 65. Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the
Interests of Another Client May Impair the Independent Professional Judgment of
the Lawyer.(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, except to the extent
permitted under DR 5-105 (C).(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his inde-
pendent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affected by his representation of another client, except to the extent
permitted under DR 5-105 (C).(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105 (A) and (B), a lawyer may repre-
sent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent theinterest of each and if each consents to the representation after full dis-
closure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his
independent professional judgment on behalf of each.(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from em-
ployment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate of his or his firm may
accept or continue such employment.
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(3) Prejudice or damage his client during the course of
the professional relationship, except as required un-
der DR 7-102 (B).
This affirmative duty of the lawyer to seek all lawful remedies
for his client
derives from his membership in a profession which has the duty of as-
sisting members of the public to secure and protect available legal rights
and benefits. In our government of laws and not of men, each member
of our society is entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in
accordance with the law; to seek any lawful objective through legally
permissible means; and to present for adjudication any lawful claim,
issue, or defense.24
Not only does everyone have a right to representation, but he
has a right to effective representation. This right is based on both
the contract between the attorney and client, and on the attorney's
role as an officer of the courts which exist to administer the laws
governing every citizen.
These obligations of contract and of role, as enumerated in
DR 7-101 (A) (1-3), are broad and, at first glance, quite burden-
some. But a closer inspection shows that these are the functions
performed by the attorney in an average case. The emphasis in sec-
tion (1) is on "reasonably available means" for seeking the remedy
for which the lawyer is employed; this is an obligation of his posi-
tion as lawyer. Section (2) forbids breaching the contract of em-
ployment as lawyer. Section (3) commands that a lawyer not sab-
otage his client's case. Taken as a whole, this Disciplinary Rule
merely says that a lawyer shall perform his duty as attorney when
he contracts to do so. This is what the lawyer usually does.
The importance of this Disciplinary Rule is that it is disciplin-
ary; usually obeying a commandment is not enough. Each time a
lawyer fails to seek his client's legal rights through legally available
means, he not only breaches the contract but breaks the rules gov-
erning his professional life. This Disciplinary Rule makes the law-
yer's duty to his client a duty also to the Bar; failure to live up
to this duty is reason for sanction by the Bar.
In contrast, California imposes no statutory duty upon its at-
torneys comparable to that outlined in the Code. Certainly Califor-
nia provides disciplinary action for violation of the attorney's oath 25
and for gross negligence, which qualifies as moral turpitude.2 6 But
24 Id., EC 7-1, at 76.
25 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6067 (West 1962).
26 Id. § 6106. California courts ordinarily hold that gross negligence is moral
turpitude within the meaning of this statute.
[Vol. 1
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rather than a matter for discipline, California sees inattention to
clients' affairs as grounds for a civil suit based on breach of con-
tract. For example, in the famous case of Lucas v. Hamm,27 plain-
tiffs sued as third party beneficiaries of a will prepared by defendant
for the deceased. A provision of the will establishing a trust for
plaintiffs was invalid as a violation of the rule against perpetuities
and an illegal restraint on alienation. The court held that plaintiffs
did have a right to sue an attorney for negligence in performing his
contract with the client, but that the principles involved in the
invalid trust were so complex that the defendant was not liable for
negligence in writing the will.
Had the conduct of Hamm been negligent, Lucas would have
been able to recover the value of the trust. Hamm would have in-
curred liability for his breach of contractual duty to Lucas. But in
all probability this breach of contract would not have resulted in
any disciplinary action by the State Bar, since there is no provision
in California statutes comparable to DR 7-101 (A) (2). The Dis-
ciplinary Rule makes a lawyer liable to his client, as does the
California case law; but unless the lawyer's breach of duty be
either gross negligence or a breach of his oath, he breaches no duty
to the Bar. This is the primary difference between DR 7-101 (A)
and California law. The Disciplinary Rule adds a punitive dimen-
sion to what California sees as only a contractual problem.
In addition to giving the client this civil remedy against the
lawyer, the courts are willing to do what they can to remedy the
attorney's failure to carry out his contract. In a singular case in
1933,28 the California Supreme Court considered the merits of an
appeal, though the attorney for the respondent failed to appear in
the proceedings and did not file a brief. While reproaching the
attorney for being remiss, the court took upon itself the duty of
combing the trial record for error and surprisingly enough (or per-
haps not so surprisingly) found in favor of respondent. The attorney
for respondent, it seems, never was called upon to account for his
actions in a civil or disciplinary action.
In an even more blatant case of dereliction,29 plaintiff's attorney
failed to serve adverse parties in a wrongful death action, or to take
any other steps until the statute of limitations had run. Despite
repeated phone calls from the client (which the lawyer never re-
turned) and notice that plaintiff had retained a new attorney to
whom he should send the files, the attorney did nothing at all, and
27 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961).
28 Larimer v. Smith, 130 Cal. App. 98, 19 P.2d 825 (1933).
29 Daley v. 'County of Butte, 227 Cal. App. 2d 380, 38 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1964).
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the case was dismissed. The appellate court held that a client, as
principal, is responsible for the actions of his attorney, as agent;
but the client as layman is bewildered by the rituals of the court,
and must rely upon his lawyer to act for him. Plaintiff should
therefore not be penalized for the incompetence of his attorney,
and the order dismissing the suit was reversed. Again it appears
that the State Bar took no disciplinary action, and that the client
brought no action in damages against the attorney. Mere inaction-
even breach of contract-is not grounds for sanction by the State
Bar, although the client here could probably have recovered actual
damages caused by the lawyer's inaction.
Although inaction is not usually grounds for discipline in Cal-
ifornia, the State Bar will discipline an attorney who takes affirma-
tive steps which prejudice his client's case. Thus in the case of
Hinds v. State Bar,30 the California Supreme Court approved the
suspension of an attorney who acted in a manner which tended to
injure his client. As attorney for the wife in a divorce action, Hinds
prepared a quit claim deed of property from the husband to the
wife. Either to secure his own fee or to prevent the wife from de-
frauding her husband in the property settlement, Hinds added the
name of his niece as a grantee on this deed. Whether this act was
to insure his own position or to protect the husband, the court found
such an act injurious to the client's case and a breach of Hind's
duty as her legal representative. The California rule, then, seems
completely in accord with DR 7-101 (A) (3).
Both DR 7-101 (A) and California law recognize that a lawyer
must represent his client zealously, seeking lawful remedies through
'reasonably available means." Both see this as a contractual duty,
giving the client an action for breach of contract in case of failure
to perform. But the ABA Disciplinary Rule goes further in making
breach of contract grounds for disciplinary action. Such discipline
for neglect of client is practically unknown in California.
Although California recognizes the extent and importance of
the problem, its solutions are relatively weak. The Board of Gov-
ernors may take action for failure to live up to the attorney's oath
"faithfully to discharge the duties of an attorney at law to the best
of his knowledge and ability;" ' the supreme court may take action
for "any act involving moral turpitude."32 But the fact is that mere
failure to do something which the lawyer should have done in the
course of representation seldom qualifies as violation of the oath,
30 19 Cal. 2d 87. 119 P.2d 134 (1941).
31 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6067 (West 1962).
32 Id. § 6106.
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and still more seldom qualifies as moral turpitude. The State Barsimply has no authority in the majority of cases involving the at-torney's breach of his contract of employment.
RECOMMENDATION: The legislature should adopt DR 7-101(A) as part of the California Business and Professions Code. Per-haps the Rule will impose a new responsibility on California at-torneys, but it will have a number of beneficial effects.
First, this Disciplinary Rule will inspire greater confidence inthe legal profession. A client who is being represented knows thatthe Bar Association guarantees the quality of his lawyer's work. Thelawyer will use reasonable diligence in seeking the client's remedies,
or he will have to explain his failure to do so to the rest of theprofession. If well enforced, this Disciplinary Rule could go far to
reduce the incidence, both real and supposed, of inadequate repre-
sentation.
Second, the legal profession should police its own activities tosee that clients are getting proper representation. Lawyers have amonopoly on the practice of law, and implicit in any monopoly isthe possibility of shoddy craftsmanship and lack of perseverencein performing the work that must be done. This tendency is over-
come to a large degree by the basic integrity of most attorneys andthe importance of a personal reputation for competence and energy.But the few instances in which a client may have a case which hiscounsel considers "too small" to warrant full exploitation is reason
enough for the State Bar to insure that every contract of employ-
ment will be carried out completely and competently.
Third, this Disciplinary Rule will strengthen the advocate sys-tem. The system operates best when both sides are fully prepared
and genuinely interested in seeking their clients' remedies. When
counsel for one party fails to appear, to make an important motion,to file a brief or a complaint or to take any other measure necessary
to obtain his client's rights, the court is required to compensate forthe lawyer's negligence. Unequipped to prepare the case for oneside or the other, the court is in a difficult and unaccustomed posi-tion which, despite its best efforts, may yield an unjust judgmentfor the client who is inadequately represented.
Finally, DR 7-101 (A) adds no duty which the lawyer doesnot already realize that he has, that is, the duty to fulfill the con-tract with his client. It does add accountability to the State Bar forbreach of this contract; but the lawyer is already under a con-tractual duty to adequately represent the client. Hence this Dis-ciplinary Rule, like any good rule of conduct, will have no effect
1969]
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on the vast majority of conscientious practitioners. Only those few
who knowingly fail to carry out their contracts of employment incur
an accountability to the State Bar for dereliction; this accountability
would certainly be beneficial to the profession. The Board of Gov-
ernors of the State Bar, composed as it is of eminent California
lawyers, is particularly well-equipped to administer this Disciplinary
Rule. The decision of a court or jury in a civil suit for breach of
contract should not be binding on the Board, which ought to make
its own inquiries and findings to determine whether discipline is
warranted. By enforcing this standard, the Board should see 
that
no lawyer is unjustly held liable for failure to adequately represent
his client; at the same time enforcement will enhance the reputation
of the profession in general and move California closer to the goal
of true justice through protection of the legal rights of every person
in the state.
DR 7-101 (B) In his representation of a client, a lawyer may:
(1) Where permissible, exercise his professional judg-
ment to waive or fail to assert a right or position of
his client.
This Disciplinary Rule is explained as follows: "In certain
areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the cause
or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled
to make decisions on his own. But otherwise the authority to make
decisions is exclusively that of the client ...""
Clearly an attorney must have the freedom to make or fail to
make objections, to frame the pleadings, to make motions and to
develop a theory of the case. This exercise of discretion is a part
of the representation, for the only effective representation is that in
which the lawyer can choose the most effective method of achieving
his client's remedy, waiving the procedural alternatives which would
be less effective. Such waiver of ineffective or impractical procedures
is not a violation of DR 7-101 (A), for the less effective means are
not "reasonable" if their waiver in favor of more effective means
is possible.1
4
California recognizes this need for exercise of discretion in its
case law. In the California Supreme Court case of People v. Matt-
son,-5 the defendant asserted his constitutional rights to appointed
33 ABA CoDE, EC 7-7, at 77.
34 Note that ABA CODE, DR 7-101 (A) (1), at 86, requires the lawyer to use "all
reasonable means," which does not include "all means." The Disciplinary 
Rule thus
recognizes the need for the exercise of discretion by the lawyer.
85 51 Cal. 2d 777, 336 P.2d 937 (1959).
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counsel and to represent himself at the same time. He wanted to
appear in pro pia persona, with an attorney to take care of "legal
matters" while he handled the case himself. The court denied Matt-
son the use of an attorney as law clerk, holding that he had the
right to appointed counsel, but that an attorney must be free to
manage the case. To the extent that an attorney acts at the direction
of the layman in discretionary matters, he is not performing his
function as attorney.
Another attorney's discretion was called into question in an
earlier criminal case in which defendant was convicted of robbery."
On appeal he claimed that his defense attorney erred in asking him
on the witness stand whether defendant was paying the lawyer any
fee. Since counsel was court-appointed, the defendant answered that
he was not paying the attorney anything (the attorney explained to
the appellate court that he just didn't want the jury to think that
he was getting any of "the loot"). The court upheld the conviction
saying that an attorney may try the case any way he wishes so long
as he gives an adequate defense. Although it may disapprove of the
method in which counsel presents the case, the court should leave
this to his discretion and refrain from interfering in the presentation
unless absolutely necessary.
In a well-written opinion, People v. Blye 7 the court of appeals
drew a sharp distinction between basic rights and procedural rights,
holding that the attorney has discretionary control over the pro-
cedure only. Blye was convicted of burglary when the public de-
fender, in chambers and outside the presence of his client, withdrew
the plea of not guilty, saying that he felt the defendant was guilty.
The attorney also refused to let Blye testify because he believed
his client would lie on the stand. In reversing the conviction, the
court said that basic rights such as the plea and the right to testify
may be exercised only by the client. When the attorney disagrees
regarding the client's exercise of these basic rights, it is his duty
to withdraw from the case. Only the client may waive a basic right.
Both DR 7-101 (B) and California case law are substantially
the same, for they recognize the necessity that an attorney be free
to waive certain rights of the client in the course of representation.
But without interpretation the Disciplinary Rule says little-,-only
that rights of the client may be waived "where permissible." Cal-
ifornia has no comparable rule in statutory form, and a study of
the case law is necessary to determine that any attorney has wide
386 People v. Wheeler, 113 Cal. App. 2d 881, 249 P.2d 299 (1952).
37 233 Cal. App. 2d 143, 43 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1965).
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discretion in presenting the case, but may not exercise independent
control over basic and substantial rights.
RECOMMENDATION: The Board of Governors of the State Bar
should adopt the following as a Rule of Professional Conduct: "In
his representation of a client, a lawyer may exercise his professional
judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or position of his client
which does not affect the merits of the case or substantially prejudice
the basic rights of the client." This proposed rule is a synthesis of
California law and the ABA Disciplinary Rule, intended to bring
sharply into focus this significant aspect of the attorney's repre-
sentation.
First, it clarifies the position of the State Bar, affirming the
lawyer's broad discretion in presenting the case. The rule also limits
this discretion to matters properly within the discretion of counsel,
denying to him those decisions which are so important that only
the client can make them. Such matters as entering a plea or settling
out of court are so basic that they fall outside the sole discretion
of counsel, who is reminded by this rule of the necessity that he
consult with his client before taking such actions.
Second, the imposition of discipline on attorneys who usurp
their position as the representative of the client protects the client
by making such misconduct less frequent. Withdrawing a plea of
not guilty, or settling the claim without the client's consent, are
serious matters. No lawyer should feel that he can abuse his position
by taking such steps; no lawyer worthy of the name would do so.
The action of waiving a client's basic rights without his consent is
unprofessional and reprehensible. The proposed rule attempts to
prevent such a waiver and to punish the lawyer who wastes his
client's legal rights in that way.
Finally, this recommendation complements DR 7-101 (A) by
further defining the process of seeking the client's legal objectives
through reasonably available means. In effect the recommended rule
permits a lawyer to disregard those means which are not reasonable
-an essential consideration. However, this consideration does not
belong in the Business and Professions Code (which states affirm-
ative duties), since the Rule does not assert an affirmative duty
directly. The proposed rule serves instead to define the affirmative
duty to fulfill the contract of employment. It protects against a
misinterpretation of DR 7-101 (A) and of the case law which makes
a lawyer liable to his client for negligence, since it makes clear that
a proper waiver of the client's prerogatives is not negligence or
breach of contract.
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As a rule of Professional Conduct, this rule must be construedbroadly to give the lawyer wide discretion. If any question exists
as to whether the waiver was proper, the doubt should be resolvedin favor of the lawyer; otherwise the rule could prove so restrictive
that it might restrain a lawyer from making full use of his positionto the detriment of the client. The Board of Governors of the StateBar is well-suited to administer such a rule, protecting both the
attorney and his client against a possible distortion of their rela-
tionship.
DR 7-101 (B) [In his representation of a client, a lawyer may:]
(2) Refuse to aid or participate in conduct that he be-
lieves to be unlawful, even though there is some
support for an argument that the conduct is legal.
The meaning and purpose of this rule are clear. The most basic
of legal axioms is that the attorney, whose job it is to uphold thelaw, must not participate in activity which is against the law. ThisDisciplinary Rule, in conjunction with the mandate of DR 7-102(A) (8), sets out the principle that a lawyer may not participatein illegal activity whether in his representation of a client or not.Such a restriction is the major qualification on how far a lawyer
may go in his representation of a client, that is, "zealously withinthe bounds of the law." In representing a client, the lawyer may
neither be forced by his client to break the law, nor do so on his
own initiative. Refusing to break the law, says DR 7-101 (B) (2),is not inadequate representation; therefore a lawyer may (and underDR 7-102 (A) (8) must) refuse to take part in illegal actions. Thebounds of the law are essential restrictions on the zeal which alawyer must use in representing his client.
As one might expect, California law yields essentially the same
rule. The attorney has a duty "to counsel or maintain such actions,proceedings or defenses only as appear to him legal or just ....The California rule is an affirmative statement of the same principlelaid out in the ABA Code-that a lawyer shall not take steps which
are against the law, and his client can't make him do it. In one
case,3 9 after a client finished giving him the fourth different version
of how an auto accident occurred, an attorney was entitled to with-draw from the case. Convinced that he cannot urge a case based
on untruthful allegations of his client, a lawyer must decline to pre-
sent the case. Any other course would be the perpetration of a fraud
on the judicial system, which is illegal and therefore unethical.
88 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(c) (West 1962).
39 Home Indemnity Co. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1948).
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Essentially the same opinion appears in the case of Hinds v.
State Bar." The court there said that if Hinds' allegation were true,
and his client intended to defraud her husband by receiving a deed
to property from him and then denying that she had any separate
property, his duty was to refuse to participate in that transaction.
A lawyer may maintain only such actions as appear to him legal.
Fraud is not legal.
The imperative that a lawyer not participate in illegal conduct,
then, is recognized in essentially the same way by both the ABA
Code and California law. The only apparent difference is that the
ABA Code explicitly states that a lawyer may refuse to participate
in unlawful conduct, "even though there is some support for an
argument that the conduct is legal." California implicitly recog-
nizes this enhancement of the rule, but does not come out with it
in so many words.
This refinement of the rule against unlawful conduct is im-
portant, for it makes practical a principle which would otherwise
be unworkable. An attorney cannot be expected to walk a narrow
path between conduct in fact unlawful on the one hand, and conduct
not unlawful but which he in good faith believed to be unlawful on
the other, incurring injury if he falls either way.
Realistically, if an attorney is expected not to do unlawful acts,
he must be given the discretion to refuse to do acts which he be-
lieves are unlawful, even though some might argue that they are
legal. When faced with an alternative he thinks is probably unlaw-
ful, the attorney must be able to disregard it without feeling that
such a good faith judgment can leave him liable for breach of con-
tract. The lawyer's objectivity in deciding such questions should
never be clouded by fear of reprisal for an honest mistake.
RECOMMENDATION: This provision should be adopted as it
stands by the Board of Governors in the same Rule of Professional
Conduct as DR 7-101 (B) (1), above.
First, it completes the provision of California Business and
Professions Code section 6068, that a lawyer shall maintain only
such actions "as appear to him legal." By adding the explicit state-
ment that a lawyer may refuse to participate in unlawful conduct
despite arguments his actions are legal, the attorney is encouraged
in his refusal to press claims or use methods which are questionable.
This encouragement improves the quality of representation given
by California attorneys, since it prohibits "shady" and "sharp" prac-
40 Hinds v. State Bar, 19 Cal. 2d 87, 119 P.2d 134 (1941).
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tices. Improved observance of higher standards of practice is, after
all, the goal of all provisions for professional standards. Adoption
of this rule will tend to improve observance of and hence raise pro-
fessional standards regarding the avoidance of unlawful actions.
Second, it will modify and define the rules regarding repre-
sentation of a client. When an attorney refuses to employ a means
of attaining his client's legal objectives, he runs the risk of a suit
for breach of contract (and discipline under DR 7-101 (A) (1))
unless he is excused by law from employing such means. Unlawful-
ness of the act is grounds for such a refusal under California law.
Under the Disciplinary Rule, a belief that the method is unlawful
is sufficient justification for not using it. And so it should be; other-
wise, the threat of suit for failure to pursue the client's remedy
looms over him each time a lawyer decides whether an act is lawful.
Removing this cloud encourages a decision against questionable
methods, improving professional conduct.
Finally, the rule lets a client know that his attorney has true
discretion in determining whether the course advocated by the client
is lawful. The lawyer need do no more than point to the rule, saying,
"I think this conduct is unlawful, and I need not do it no matter
what you say." Convincing a client that his way is the wrong way,
in the absence of such reinforcement, may require extensive legal
explanations that he may not understand anyway. The client's con-
fidence in the attorney's judgment as to methods to be used is in-
creased by the knowledge that the law trusts his lawyer's judgment
as to the lawfulness of the act.
Good faith must be involved in every such judgment. Other-
wise, the lawyer may arbitrarily toss aside any proposal as "unlaw-
ful," justifying his decision with "because I think so." Interpreted
properly, this Disciplinary Rule can be of great value in defining
and limiting the attorney's duty to represent his client, by keeping
it within the bounds of the law.
DR 7-102 Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law.
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, de-
lay a trial or take other action on behalf of his client
when he knows or it is obvious that such action
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure
another.
California law presently imposes a duty upon an attorney to
'"counsel or maintain such actions, proceedings or defenses only as
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appear to him legal or just, ...."' The attorney also has the duty
"to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party
or witness, unless required by the justice [of his cause] .''42 The
California Supreme Court applied this latter section to the conduct
of an attorney in the case of In re Sadicogi.
43
Sadicoff and others appeared for the plaintiff in a breach of
contract action. They prepared an affidavit charging a well-known
actress with allegedly immoral and perhaps fictitious matters which
were prejudicial to her reputation and character. The trial court
ordered the affidavit sealed, but Sadicoff withheld it from filing for
five days in order to force a settlement or otherwise cause harm by
threat of publication of the statements. The contents of the affidavit
were communicated to a newsman during that time. Citing the
statutory duty of attorneys to refrain from advancing facts prejudi-
cial to the reputation of a party, and finding that Sadicoff's cause
did not require the delay, the supreme court ordered that he be
suspended from the practice of law for six months. The court recog-
nized by this decision that California prohibits action on behalf of
a client which serves merely to harass or injure another. The ABA
Code's Disciplinary Rule prohibits similar conduct on the part of
an attorney.
The California State Bar Board of Governors has supplemented
the statutory duties of an attorney, to maintain only legal or just
actions and to refrain from prejudicing the character of a witness
or party, with a Rule of Professional Conduct which requires that:
A member of the State Bar shall not accept employment to prosecute
or defend a case solely out of spite, or solely for the purpose of haras-
sing or delaying another; nor shall he take or prosecute an appeal
merely for delay, or for any other reason, except in good faith.
44
This California Rule prohibits even the acceptance of employment
in a case which is designed to harass or delay, and the state supreme
court has pointed out that disciplinary action would be proper
against an attorney who takes an appeal which has no proper appel-
late objective.45
RECOMMENDATION: No member of the legal profession should
be allowed to use legal procedures to harass or injure another. This
is the substance of Disciplinary Rule 7-102 (A) (1). By judicial
41 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(c) (West 1962).
42 Id. § 6068(f).
43 208 Cal. 555, 282 P. 952 (1929).
44 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076 (Rule 13) (West 1962).
45 People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 336 P.2d 937 (1959).
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interpretation of the statutory duties of an attorney as in Sadicoff,
and by application of the Rules of Professional Conduct of theCalifornia State Bar, California law is adequately equipped to
achieve the same end. Both the ABA Rule and California law pro-
tect the innocent attorney who might prejudice the reputation of
a party or witness when it is required by his client's legitimate inter-
ests. Under the ABA Disciplinary Rule, an attorney is punished
when he knows or it is obvious that legal action will serve merely
to harass or injure another. In California, wilful conduct in contra-
vention of a statutory duty or a Rule of Conduct is required."
Because DR 7-102 (A) (1) is consistent with present Califor-
nia law, there is no reason to enact the section as an amendment to
the duties of an attorney or to adopt it as a Rule of Professional
Conduct. The Rule ought merely to be commended to the members
of the State Bar under Rule 1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
DR 7-102 (A) [In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall
not:]
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is un-
warranted under existing law, except that he may
advance such a claim or defense if it can be sup-
ported by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.
Some indication that the Disciplinary Rule in this area is al-
ready judicial law in California can be found in such a case asSullivan v. State Bar,4" construing the code section requiring an at-
torney to "counsel or maintain such actions ...only as appear tohim legal or just . ,,48 In a rather complicated factual situationSullivan had procured, through an execution sale, certain real prop-
erty by a deed in his nephew's name. Although the sheriff's sale in
satisfaction of his client's lien had been recalled, Sullivan maintainedbefore the Disciplinary Board of the State Bar that his client's lien
may have been transferred to the nephew and that a subsequent
suit for foreclosure of the lien was then entirely proper. The Board
ruled that the foreclosure suit was instituted merely to harass anddelay one of the parties who had had the sale set aside. The state
supreme court reversed, holding that there was no evidence that
the attorney did not honestly believe that his actions had a legalbasis or that he maintained the action in bad faith. No evidence
showed that his motive in transferring the property to his nephew
46 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6077, 6103 (West 1962).
47 28 Cal. 2d 488, 170 P.2d 888 (1946).
48 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(c) (West 1962).
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was unethical, and neither ignorance nor incompetence, without
more, is grounds for discipline. 9 In effect, and expressed in terms
of the Disciplinary Rule, the court ruled that Sullivan's prosecution
of the foreclosure suit was supported by a good faith argument for
extension of existing law to his situation. On the other hand, had
the evidence shown a lack of good faith on Sullivan's part, as the
State Bar Disciplinary Board alleged, the court would have affirmed
the recommended disciplinary action.
RECOMMENDATION: Both the California courts and the new
ABA Disciplinary Rule require that an attorney knowingly take ac-
tion unfounded in existing law or unsupportable by a good faith
argument before the attorney is subject to discipline. The Sullivan
case indicates that the California requirement that an action "ap-
pear" just or legal to an attorney is equivalent to the ABA provision
that an action be supported by a good faith argument before an
attorney can defend himself against a charge of reprehensible con-
duct. Since the two rules are compatible, the ABA Rule does not
require enactment as a code section or a Rule of Conduct but should
be commended to the members of the State Bar as are the ABA
Canons of Ethics.
DR 7-102 (A) [In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall
not:]
(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he
is required by law to reveal.
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.
(6) Participate in the creation or preservation of false
evidence when he knows or it is obvious that the
evidence is false.
These four subdivisions of the Rule, when taken together, pro-
hibit an attorney from using the privileges of his office to perpetrate
a fraud. Any fraudulent conduct on his part is likely to fall within
any one or more of the four subdivisions. For example, in McMahon
v. State Bar,'° the attorney filed a petition for special letters of ad-
ministration alleging on information and belief that the deceased had
died intestate. The supreme court, however, held that the evi-
dence showed this allegation to be false, and the court ruled that
McMahon had sufficient knowledge of the existence of a will to
49 Sullivan v. State Bar, 28 Cal. 2d 488, 495, 170 P.2d 888, 893 (1946).
50 39 Cal. 2d 367, 246 P.2d 931 (1952).
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justify his suspension from practice for sixty days. Under California
law, the court ruled that he had violated his oath," used means
inconsistent with the truth52 and engaged in conduct involving moral
turpitude.5 3
Expressed in terms of the Disciplinary Rule of the ABA Code,
McMahon knowingly failed to disclose the existence of a will, used
and participated in the creation of false evidence and by such par-
ticipation, made a false statement of fact. The attorney, by virtue
of his position, owes a fiduciary duty to the courts; and the ABA
Disciplinary Rule does nothing more than prohibit an attorney from
perpetrating a fraud on the court by act or omission. California
accomplishes the same end by the simple formulation that attorneys
shall use means consistent with the truth in maintaining the causes
confided to them.
RECOMMENDATION: While the ABA Disciplinary Rule enumer-
ates four prohibitions, any fraudulent conduct on the part of attor-
neys is likely to fall within all four categories. The California rules
applied in McMahon demonstrate that California is amply equipped
to handle a fraud perpetrated by any attorney. To enact the Dis-
ciplinary Rule in this area as a new code section or to enact it as
a Rule of Professional Conduct would be to needlessly repeat what
is already covered by California law. Since the Rule is stated in a
different and perhaps more explicit fashion than California law on
this subject, the Rule should be commended to the members of the
State Bar under the Rules of Professional Conduct as an advisory
standard.
DR 7-102 (A) [In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall
not:]
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct the lawyer
knows to be illegal or fraudulent.
In Calfornia, a lawyer may not "advise the violation of any
law [though he may advise in good faith that a law is invalid] .54
Advising the violation of law subjects an attorney to disciplinary
action. Application of this rule resulted in three months' suspension
for an attorney who advised that the name of a bank be erased from
the face of a will even though the court was not misled thereby.55
Likewise, disciplinary action was affirmed against another attorney
51 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6067 (West 1962).
52 Id. § 6068(d).
53 Id. § 6106.
54 Id. § 6076 (Rule 11).
55 Bar Ass'n v. De Vail, 59 Cal. App. 230, 210 P. 279 (1922).
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who advised his client to testify falsely regarding a robbery; the
court ruled that no attorney could counsel a client to take illegal
action.56
RECOMMENDATION: Since this subdivision of the Disciplinary
Rule is so straightforward and has its counterpart in existing Cal-
ifornia law, there is no need for official action by way of adoption.
The Rule can be commended with the rest of the ABA provisions
under Rule 1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
DR 7-102 (A) [In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall
not:]
(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or con-
duct contrary to a Disciplinary Rule.
This section is a general prohibition designed to include repre-
hensible conduct not clearly defined by the other sections. California
uses the violation of the attorney's oath 57 and the sections dealing
with the commission of a crime5" or act involving mortal turpitude"
to accomplish the same end. Ordinarily ignorance of the law is not
grounds for discipline; but conduct amounting to gross negligence
or habitual neglect of clients' affairs will be punished in California
as a breach of the attorney's oath to discharge his duties to the best
of his knowledge and ability.6" In the ABA Code, the Disciplinary
Rules covering competence of an attorney are included in Canon 6.61
In California, "conviction of a felony or misdemeanor, involv-
ing moral turpitude, constitutes a cause for disbarment or suspen-
sion ''62 Furthermore:
The commission of any act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or cor-
ruption, whether the act is committed in the course of his relations as
an attorney or otherwise, and whether the act is a felony or misdemea-
nor or not, constitutes a cause for disbarment or suspension.a
RECOMMENDATION: Since in California commission of any act
involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption is grounds for
severe disciplinary action, the proposed ABA Rule fails to add any
significant factor. If California should adopt any of the other Rules,
the already existing provisions, which provide that a breach of en-
acted rules is cause for disciplinary action, would govern, not sub-
56 In re Jones, 208 Cal. 240, 280 P. 964 (1929).
57 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6103 (West 1962).
58 Id. § 6101.
59 Id. § 6106.
60 Id. § 6067.
61 ABA CODE, DR 6-101, at 74.
62 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6101 (West 1962).
63 Id. § 6106.
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division (8)'s prohibition of "conduct contrary to a Disciplinary
Rule." As an integral part of the Code itself, a provision such as
this would be necessary, but in terms of California's potential enact-
ment or even commendation of the Code, it is superfluous.
DR 7-102 (B) A lawyer who receives information clearly estab-
lishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation,
perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall
promptly call upon his client to rectify the same,
and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he
shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or
tribunal.
According to this rule, an attorney must offer his client an op-
portunity to rectify any fraud before revealing it to the defrauded
party or tribunal. The Supreme Court of California took a slightly
different view in Hinds v. State Bar.4 In a divorce action, the at-
torney's client claimed in an affidavit that she had no separate
property and had made no arrangements for attorney's fees. In fact,
she had made arrangements for fees and she allegedly had separate
property. When the State Bar disciplinary board later held a hearing
on the alteration of a deed involved in the property settlement, the
attorney claimed that his actions were taken to protect the defrauded
husband. The board found the attorney guilty of misconduct. On
review, the supreme court held in rather broad language that if the
attorney had in good faith been convinced that the affidavit was
fraudulent, he had a duty to reveal it to the court. Nowhere does
the court mention a duty to call upon his client to rectify the fraud
before going to the court.
RECOMMENDATION: Since the attorney in Hinds was not dis-
ciplined for his failure to reveal the fraud (but rather for altering
the deed), the dictum in that case should be disregarded in favor
of the ABA Disciplinary Rule. The Rule encompasses the prob-
ability that the attorney's knowledge of a fraud would come from
a confidential communication with his client. By giving the client
the opportunity to rectify the fraud before revealing it, the Rule
allows an attorney to fulfill his fiduciary obligation. The statutory
duties of an attorney presently require him "to maintain inviolate
the confidence, and at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets,
of his client." 5 The Legislature could amend that duty to include
the ABA Disciplinary Rule. If the Legislature does not act, the State
64 19 Cal. 2d 87, 119 P.2d 134 (1941).
65 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1962).
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Bar Board of Governors can adopt the provision as a Rule of Pro-
fessional Conduct.
The Rule actually provides important protection for the at-
torney. If his client has perpetrated a fraud on the court, and the
attorney knows this by virtue of a privileged communication, he
can always request that he be allowed to withdraw from the case.
If a judge should demand to know the reason for the request, the
attorney is faced with a dilemma. A passing remark by the Court
in the Hinds case seems to indicate that he should reveal the fraud.
Yet he is under a statutory duty to maintain the confidences and
secrets of a client. Adoption of the ABA Disciplinary Rule would
establish an explicit procedure for the attorney to follow. He would
tell the client to rectify the fraud; if the client refused, he would
have authorization under this rule to point out to the court that it
had been defrauded by his client.
DR 7-102 (B) [A lawyer who receives information clearly estab-
lishing that:]
(2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a
fraud upon a tribunal shall promptly reveal the
fraud to the tribunal.
No California cases on this point have been found, but the rule
is logically inferrable from the Hinds decision.66 If the court could
find a duty on the part of the attorney to reveal his client's fraud
upon the tribunal, in spite of the attorney-client privilege, then it
could easily find a duty to reveal the fraud of some third party to
whom the attorney owes no fiduciary duty. In a highly complicated
and technical patent decision the United States Supreme Court
reached the same result.67
RECOMMENDATION: This Rule should be adopted by the State
Bar as a Rule of Professional Conduct along with DR 7-102 (B)
(1). Regarding the fraud of third parties, California has no rule
other than its moral turpitude provision which need not be stretched
to cover a duty of an attorney to reveal a fraud to a tribunal. The
"moral" element is not clear, for example, in the case of an attorney
who is merely minding his own business. And yet a judicial body
ought not to be defrauded. Perhaps the best solution is to amend
the rule, adding that the fraud should be "in relation to matters
about which the lawyer is appearing as counsel." A limiting clause
such as this would carry out the intent of the provision and yet
66 19 Cal. 2d 87, 119 P.2d 134 (1941).
67 Precision Inst. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806
(1945).
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reduce the class to which its broad language might apply. As
amended, the Rule forms a suitable counterpart to the previous
rule about the fraudulent conduct of clients and should be adopted
by the State Bar Board of Governors.
DR 7-103 Performing the Duty of Public Prosecutor or Other
Government Lawyer.
(A) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall
not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges
when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are not
supported by probable cause.
This section is foreign to California law regulating the legal
profession. In civil practice, a public prosecutor and other "quasi-
judicial" officers are absolutely immune from suit for malicious
prosecution, a rule set down in Pearson v. Reed.68 The appellate
court found that although the evidence could support the jury's ver-
dict that the city prosecutor maliciously maintained a petty theft
action without probable cause, he was not civilly liable in damages
to the defendant. In another case, the court of appeal extended the
immunity to a prosecutor who initiated a suit without probable
cause.69 Other authorities mention no alternative relief against such
official action, other than criminal prosecution of the attorney or
ouster from office.70 While the strong public policy protecting the
government attorney from suit for malicious prosecution every time
he fails to obtain a conviction may be necessary, the legal profession
as such should have the power to discipline an attorney who pros-
ecutes a case when he knows, or it is obvious, that the charges are
not supported by probable cause. The prosection of any case is
solely within the discretion of the district attorney.71 Besides, the
rule would not require the district attorney to investigate the prob-
able cause supporting charges which he does not know to be without
merit.
RECOMMENDATION: In principle, the Disciplinary Rule is de-
signed to give assurance to the public that the broad discretionary
powers of the public prosecutor will be exercised without abuse. To
this extent the Rule would be valuable as a California Bar Rule of
Professional Conduct. Disciplinary Rules which prohibit a private
attorney from using the legal process merely to harass or injure
68 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 44 P.2d 592 (1935).
69 Norton v. Hoffmann, 34 Cal. App. 2d 189, 93 P.2d 250 (1939).
70 See, e.g., Prentice v. Bertken, 50 Cal. App. 2d 344, 123 P.2d 96 (1942) ; White
v. Brinkman, 23 Cal. App. 2d 307, 73 P.2d 254 (1937).
71 Taliaferro v. San Pablo, 187 Cal. App. 2d 153, 9 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1960).
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another have already been discussed.72 The legal profession has just
as large a stake in seeing that legal processes are not abused in the
name of the public. But if every defendant who was not convicted
could have disciplinary proceedings instituted against the pros-
ecutor in his case, then the public policy preventing civil suits would
be thwarted. If this Disciplinary Rule is made a California Rule of
Professional Conduct, the State Bar disciplinary boards would be
charged with the serious duty of protecting prosecutors from harass-
ment. This protection would be afforded through exhaustive pre-
liminary investigations.
DR 7-103 (B) The public prosecutor or other government law-
yer in criminal litigation shall make timely disclosure
to counsel for the defendant, or to the defendant if he
has no counsel, of the existence of evidence, known
to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the
degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment.
This provision of DR 7-103 is also without precedent in Cal-
ifornia law. The defense in a criminal action presently has the right
of discovery, but there is no duty on the part of the prosecutor to
disclose evidence not requested by defense counsel. The courts have
held that the state has no interest in keeping beneficial evidence
from the defense.73 Nonetheless, the defense must make the motion
for discovery, both specifying the matter to be discovered and stat-
ing a plausible justification.74 If the defense does not request dis-
covery, the prosecution need not volunteer the evidence as would
be required by this ABA Disciplinary Rule.
Ordinarily, discovery cannot be used to acquire investigatory
evidence unless the defendant can show some better cause for inspec-
tion than a mere desire to benefit from the information gathered by
the people.75 Pretrial discovery in criminal cases is based on the
rules of discovery, not on Constitutional due process.7 6 This last
principle seems inconsistent with the proposition that a prosecuting
attorney's duty is to seek justice, not convictions-a proposition set
down in People v. Hail7T The court of appeal, in admonishing the
prosecutor for an improper remark to the jury, said the public
72 See text accompanying notes 41-46, supra.
73 People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956); Norton v. Superior Ct.,
173 'Cal. App. 2d 133, 343 P.2d 139 (1959).
74 Ballard v. Superior Ct., 64 Cal. 2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966).
75 People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 755, 349 P.2d 964, 3 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1960).
76 Jones v. Superior Ct., 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
77 25 'Cal. App. 342, 143 P. 803 (1914).
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prosecutor represents the people of whom the accused is a member.He also represents the law which condemns rather than commands
conviction for an offense upon insufficient evidence. Yet despite
these grand principles, the courts consistently hold that discoveryis not a matter of Constitutional right. To understand this is to
understand that the whole theory of the adversary system rejectsthe notion that one side may sit back while the prosecution gathers
all the information in relation to a case.
Nonetheless, the American Bar Association's Code Committeefound that the prosecutor's duty to seek justice was paramount to
the procedures of discovery. That duty to seek justice exists because
of the following: The discretionary power of the prosecutor as
representative of the sovereign, the role of the prosecutor as advo-
cate of the public interest and the presumed innocence of the
accused.8
RECOMMENDATION: This Disciplinary Rule does not requirethat a prosecuting attorney reveal his entire case to the defense, or
even that he reveal all his information. It requires only that theprosecutor reveal to the defense known evidence which properlybelongs to the defense-that which tends to negate guilt, mitigatethe degree or reduce punishment. Considering the broad discretion-
ary powers of the prosecuting attorney, and his public duty to seekjustice, this Disciplinary Rule should be adopted as a CaliforniaRule of Professional Conduct. As the legal profession experiments
with such a rule, it will become aware of what burdens are imposed
upon public prosecutors and will be able to evaluate measures that
may be applied in case of breach of the Rule. The essence of thisRule, and its counterpart DR 7-103 (A), should be taken up for
extensive debate among members of the State Bar in order to gauge
the possible effects. Members of the Bar must consider that thoroughinvestigation of criminal matters might well be discouraged by such
a rule. Prosecutors may hesitate to try cases which ought to be triedfor fear of disciplinary action if their discretion is adjudged to be
in error.
The success of such a rule depends on the wisdom displayedin its enforcement. Only the clearest cases of abuse of public office
ought to be tried. If all doubts are resolved in favor of the pros-
ecutor, then the Rule can achieve the purpose for which it wasdesigned-professional integrity, in the public as well as private
sphere.
78 ABA CODE, EC 7-13, at 79.
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DR 7-104 Communicating with One of Adverse Interest.
(A) During the course of his representation of a client, a
lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on
the subject of the representation with a party he
knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter
unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer repre-
senting such other party or is authorized by law to
do so.
This rule is important because our advocate system "functions
best when persons in need of legal advice or assistance are repre-
sented by their own counsel." 9 The nature of advocacy is having
counsel for each party representing only the interests of that party;
but this must be done in such a manner that the efforts of the advo-
cate for an adverse party are not undone. If a lawyer were permitted
to communicate with an adverse party without the permission of his
counsel, he would be tempted to undercut the efforts of that counsel.
This would weaken the structure of the advocate system.
The layman seeks a lawyer to represent him because he is
unable to cope with his own legal problems. The lawyer, both as
advisor and as advocate, protects the legal interests of his client,
for an attorney is the only person able to do so. Therefore it is
counsel for the adverse party, and not the party himself with whom
all matters should usually be discussed.
The whole principle of legal representation is based on the
concept of a lawyer representing his client. The legal issues, beyond
the ability of the layman to handle competently, are resolved by
having counsel for each side exert their best efforts and utilize their
most effective legal skills. When a lawyer communicates directly
with an adverse party in the absence of the party's attorney, he
denies to the adverse party the right of every person to have his
position protected by a lawyer.
California also recognizes the unfairness of direct communica-
tion between a lawyer and an adverse party by making this require-
ment a part of its Rules of Professional Conduct.
A member of the State Bar shall not communicate with a party repre-
sented by counsel upon a subject of controversy, in the absence and
without the consent of such counsel. This rule shall not apply to com-
munications with a public officer, board, committee or body.
80
79 ABA CODE, EC 7-18, at 81.
80 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076 (Rule 12) (West 1962).
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This rule finds application in many cases. For instance, a young
Dutch woman, while visiting her family in California, accompanied
her sister to a lumber yard to procure a load of plywood. Placing
the slabs of wood on the luggage rack atop her mini-bus, the Amer-
ican sister discovered to her chagrin that she possessed no lashings
with which to secure the load. Her obliging sibling clambered to
the roof of the vehicle and lay flat upon the timber, clutching the
luggage rack. Proceeding homeward immersed in strains of the
car radio, squeals of her children and barking of her dog, the driver
had no inkling that mishap was imminent until she heard a loud
thud on the road behind her, as both the girl and the plywood slid
from their perch. Mitten, the attorney for the injured Dutch sister,
obtained a judgment against the American sister, who was repre-
sented by her insurance company's lawyer. The judgment exceeded
the limits of defendant's insurance policy. While a motion for re-
trial was pending, Mitten told defendant that the next verdict would
probably be substantially higher, and persuaded her to sign a
declaration, saying in part that she had been negligent, that she had
later attempted the stunt herself and found that she had to "hang
on for dear life," that she did not desire a new trial and that she
was inadequately represented at the original trial. For communicat-
ing with this adverse party, the State Bar sought to discipline
Mitten.
In Mitten v. State Bar,81 the court found the attorney's acts
were grounds for discipline under Rule 12 of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct (communicating with adverse parties), and upheld a
three months' suspension. The lawyer retained by the insurance
company, as representative of the defendant's sister, was unable
to carry out his obligations as her attorney because of the unethical
acts of Mitten.
Both the California Rule of Professional Conduct and the ABA
Code have as their object the strengthening of the legal process by
prohibiting one lawyer from interfering with the proper perfor-
mance of adverse counsel's duties. Such conduct is outside the
bounds of the law, and therefore subject to discipline.
RECOMMENDATION: Since California already has a rule nearly
identical to DR 7-104 (A) (1), it need not adopt the Disciplinary
Rule. A general commendation of the ABA Code is sufficient.
Both the ABA's Disciplinary Rule and Rule 12 of California's
Rules of Professional Conduct express the same thought in very
similar terms, that is, an attorney may not communicate with an
81 71 A.C. 545, 455 P.2d 753, 78 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1969).
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adverse party who is represented by counsel, on the subject of the
controversy, without either having adverse counsel present or getting
his permission to do so. In this respect both rules are in complete
agreement.
The only possible distinction between the ABA's Disciplinary
Rule and the California Rule of Professional Conduct is that the
ABA Rule includes the provision that the attorney shall not cause
another to communicate with the adverse party under circumstances
in which he could not himself do so. Although this provision makes
the thought logically complete, it really adds nothing to the legal
effect. It is a basic law of agency that a principal cannot do through
an agent what the principal could not legitimately do for himself.
Without question any California lawyer who sent a henchman to
interrogate an adverse party in the absence of adverse counsel
would be just as liable as if he had done it himself.
Since California long ago recognized and applied this rule
against an attorney's communication with an adverse party in the
absence and without the permission of his counsel, DR 7-104 (A)
(1) need not be adopted in this state. It should be commended in
a general endorsement of the ABA Code.
DR 7-104 (A) [During the course of his representation of a cli-
ent, a lawyer shall not:]
(2) Give advice to a person who is not represented by
a lawyer, other than the advice to secure counsel, if
the interests of such person are, or have a reasonable
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of
his client.
The law does not require that a party to a dispute retain coun-
sel. "If one is not represented by counsel, a lawyer representing
another may have to deal directly with the unrepresented person;
in such an instance a lawyer shall not undertake to give advice to
the person who is attempting to represent himself, except that he
may advise him to obtain a lawyer." 2 The lawyer here is in a delicate
position.
Special rules apply when a layman assumes the role of his own
advocate. The most obvious conflict of interest would exist where
an attorney representing one party tried to advise an adverse party,
for one attorney cannot serve two clients. Since the layman does
not possess the skills of an attorney, he is not able to deal with an
82 ABA CODE, EC 7-18, at 81.
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attorney on equal terms. Yet the advocate system assumes that
counsel on both sides possess basic legal skills. Having such an un-
fair advantage, the lawyer cannot be permitted to deal with the
adverse party as an equal, yet he cannot give him advice as a client
either, if the lawyer is to maintain fidelity to the interests he repre-
sents. Therefore, the lawyer must have as little to do with the lay-
man as possible-he really can say little of value to the layman
who chooses to represent himself, except that the layman ought to
seek counsel.
In practical terms, of course, the lawyer must have some deal-
ings with this layman. This is the only way the case can be settled.
But these dealings must not be in terms of legal advice, but more
in terms of offers for settlement which the layman must evaluate
and decide upon as best he can. The lawyer cannot, in good faith
to his client or the profession, do much more for the adverse party.
A good example of how such difficulties may arise appears in
Silver v. Shemanski.83 An attorney representing the executor of an
estate sought to work out a compromise with decedent's widow, who
was not represented by counsel. The attorney acted as mediator
while the negotiations were in progress, but when the talks broke
down he advised the widow to obtain her own lawyer. She failed
to do so, and lost the case. On appeal the widow claimed that "her
attorney" (the compromiser) had failed properly to represent her.
The court ruled that at all times-even while attempting a settlement
-the attorney was acting in behalf of the executor, and the wife had
no claim to his services. The attorney apparently did an admirable
job of handling this delicate situation.
An example of the abuses and injustices inherent in such a
situation occurred in a case considered by the California Supreme
Court in 1950.84 Turner had acted as attorney for the plaintiff at
the trial level, but the case had been taken over by another lawyer
on appeal. While the appeal was pending, Turner contacted both
parties and worked out a compromise, without the knowledge or
consent of counsel for either party. However laudable his motives,
the court held that Turner should have remained aloof from the
controversy, and should not have communicated with either party
or given legal advice to parties who were not his clients.
Although California case law seems to recognize the rule that
a lawyer shall not advise an adverse party who is not represented
by counsel, no statutory provision exists comparable to DR 7-104
83 89 Cal. App. 2d 520, 201 P.2d 418 (1949).
84 Turner v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 155, 222 P.2d 857 (1950).
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(A) (2). Yet this rule is essential to the protection of a layman's
rights when he chooses to represent himself. As long as the layman
may act as his own attorney, the legal system must take care to
protect his rights; otherwise the ideal of equal rights for all is hol-
low. However imprudent it may be not to secure an attorney, the
choice of whether to retain counsel is left to the layman. His rights
nevertheless should be protected against the unfair advantage which
some attorneys might take of the layman's vulnerable position.
RECOMMENDATION: DR 7-104 (A) (2) should be adopted by
the Board of Governors of the State Bar as part of Rule 12 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.
First, the layman needs this protection. His legal rights do not
disappear as soon as he decides to act as his own counsel, although
he is probably hurting his chances of securing them by such a choice.
The legal arena is competitive and demanding beyond the skills of
the layman, but he has a right to be there. Since the judicial sys-
tem exists to administer justice, rather than to provide an arena
for competition among attorneys, the layman must be given a special
break. This break consists in his not having to fight out a settlement
on a one-to-one basis with the attorney outside of court. The rules
of advocacy do not strictly apply to the layman; the court does not
hold the layman to the strict standards it sets for attorneys; and
the attorneys must make special provisions, too, for dealing with
this layman who represents himself.
Second, the lawyer owes a duty to his client not to advise an
adverse party. Although most lawyers are probably capable of con-
sidering most situations objectively and giving the arguments for
each side, when an attorney assumes the representation of a client
he cannot act also as advisor to the adverse party. Each situation is
different, but probably the furthest extent to which a lawyer may
go in dealing with a layman as adverse party is to offer terms of
settlement to him. Anything more than this would be advising one
whose interests are in direct conflict with those of a client. This
is a breach of the lawyer's fiduciary duty.
Finally, the lawyer himself should have the backing of such
a statute such as DR 7-104 (A) (2) to make clear to any adverse
party who asks for advice that he cannot give it. Some laymen, not
understanding the advocate system, look to the attorney as an
impartial advisor, capable of dispensing dissertations on the law
whenever asked to do so. To protect his position as advocate, the
lawyer must decline to give any such notice to the adverse party.
His position is made that much stronger if he can decline by saying
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that there is a law against his giving such advice. Sometimes this
is the only type of explanation which a layman can understand.
DR 7-105 Threatening Criminal Prosecution:
(A) A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting or
threaten to present criminal proceedings or threaten to
present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage
in a civil matter.
Civil actions decide disputes as to whether a personal wrong
has been done to the plaintiff. Criminal actions involve the deter-
mination of whether punishment is merited by the defendant as a
deterrent to protect society. Any action at law should be decided
through the legal processes of fact-gathering and impartial decision
(although some types of inducement and compromise, without
coercion, are proper tools for arriving at just decisions).
Threat of criminal prosecution is not a proper tool for winning
a civil suit. Such abuse of process is not an inducement, but black-
mail; it does not bring about a settlement, but only submission.
The threat of criminal prosecution is an abuse of both the criminal
and civil processes and is impermissible for anyone-most especially
an officer of the court.
The lawyer who is in a position to commence or threaten crim-
inal actions is in a position of public trust. Properly handled, the
system of criminal law is society's bulwark against disorder and
violence. But if misused, the process can become a means of in-
timidation for personal gain. No system of criminal justice can
permit itself to be used for the personal ends of its administrators.
Likewise the civil system sets up a forum and rules of law to
prevent the powerful from imposing their wills on others. Since the
threat of criminal prosecution is a powerful weapon, its application
to civil suits places the threatened party in a position where he must
either give up his legal rights or submit to criminal prosecution and
possible imprisonment. This intimidation is not rule of law, but rule
of force; it must be resisted and repudiated by the entire legal
profession.
Certainly the institution of criminal proceedings is decretionary
with the district attorney, and his integrity should not be questioned
unless clear abuse presents itself. Use of the criminal process solely
for gaining advantage in a civil suit would be such an abuse. Any
attorney who files a complaint as a means of obtaining advantage
in a civil action should be severely punished, whether he be a gov-
ernment lawyer or not. The prohibition imposed by this Disciplinary
Rule applies to all members of the legal profession.
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California has no statute comparable to DR 7-105 (A), although
there are many provisions under which such misconduct can be
disciplined:
It is the duty of an attorney:
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions, proceedings, or defenses only
as appear to him legal or just...
(d) To employ for the purpose of maintaining the cases confided to him
such means only as are consistent with truth . . .
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of
an action or proceeding from any corrupt motive of passion or in-
terest.85
The commission of any act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or
corruption . . . whether the act is a felony or misdemeanor or not,
constitutes a cause for disbarment or suspension.8 6
Although these statutes cover the field, they do it more by
patchwork than by deliberate design. Commencing a criminal action
solely to gain advantage in a civil suit would be a violation of all of
them. Cases involving prosecution for personal motives are usually
disciplined as "an act involving moral turpitude," although the other
provisions above quoted would probably do just as well. The reason
California has never adopted a statute comparable to DR 7-105 is
probably that it is so clearly an act of moral turpitude that no
special prohibition of such abuse of process was thought necessary.
RECOMMENDATION: California should commend DR 7-105 (A)
but need not adopt it as a statutory provision.
First, there is no question that the principle set out in this Dis-
ciplinary Rule is important. The evils and injustice which would re-
sult from threatening prosecution on criminal charges solely to gain
advantage in a civil suit are manifest. This abuse of process would
make a mockery of both the civil and criminal processes, destroying
rule of law and substituting for it the reign of intimidation and
threat. Every lawyer must realize'this. There is no argument in favor
of the propriety, legality or value of permitting such abuse. Anyone
who threatens or institutes such criminal proceedings should be sub-
ject to immediate and severe discipline.
Second, because this act is, however, so clearly a breach of the
lawyer's official duties, it qualifies as a clear case of moral turpitude.
California has used the provision for discipline of acts involving
85 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (West 1962).
86 Id. § 6106.
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moral turpitude to punish those attorneys who have begun criminal
prosecutions out of personal motives. This has worked well; so no
need exists to adopt the Disciplinary Rule as a separate provision.
DR 7-105 (A) speaks to the lawyers, telling them something they
already know; it provides discipline for something already covered
in California. Hence, adoption of the Disciplinary Rule as a statu-
tory provision would serve no worthwhile purpose.
Finally, because DR 7-105 (A) is in agreement with California
law, it should be commended to California attorneys as a part of the
general commendation of the ABA Code. This commendation will
give the Disciplinary Rule no legal force, but legal force is not
needed. Commending DR 7-105 (A) will serve as a reminder-if any
lawyer needs a reminder-that instituting or threatening criminal
proceedings for gain in a civil matter is reprehensible and will not
be tolerated by the profession.
DR 7-106 Trial Conduct.
(A) A lawyer shall not disregard or advise his client to dis-
regard a standing rule of a tribunal made in the course
of a proceeding, but he may take appropriate steps in
good faith to test the validity of such ruling.
Courts usually confront this rule in contempt proceedings, mak-ing reference to the attorney's statutory duty to maintain the re-
spect due courts and judicial officers."7 In Gallagher v. Municipal
Court,"8 the California Supreme Court reversed a contempt order
against an attorney who asserted in open court that his client's right
to counsel included the right to cross-examine witnesses in a judicial
investigation of allegations against his client. Those allegations were
that during recess of another trial someone had observed Gallagher's
client conversing with one of the jurors. The presiding judge ordered
an investigation during which Gallagher was repeatedly denied the
opportunity to cross-examine the jurors who were interrogated. At
the close of the questioning, the judge ordered that Gallagher's
client be taken into custody and sent to the district attorney's office.
When counsel inquired if his client was under arrest and on what
charge, the judge found him in contempt. The supreme court, in
Gallagher's appeal from the order, held that the judge had acted
properly in denying cross-examination, but that the attorney could
reasonably have believed that his client's rights were in jeopardy.
He was thus privileged to urge his point upon the court without
being held in contempt. When his client was ordered to the district
8T Id. § 6068(b).
88 31 Cal. 2d 784, 192 P.2d 905 (1948).
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attorney's office, he had a duty to inquire whether she was under
arrest, and his inquiry was not a violation of the judge's previous
order to stay out of the proceedings. In terms of the Disciplinary
Rule, the court held that the attorney was taking appropriate steps
in good faith to contest the rulings of the judge.
RECOMMENDATION: This Disciplinary Rule should be com-
mended to the members of the State Bar as an explicit formulation
of the respect due courts and judicial officers. But the Rule does not
add anything to the general rule that attorneys should be respectful.
The State Bar may apply that rule should disciplinary action against
an attorney become necessary. Members of the legal profession
know that they can test the validity of a judge's rulings by proper
procedures. Lawyers also know that they face contempt proceedings
for any blatant disregard of a judge's ruling. Any further addition
to California's substantive law in this matter is unnecessary.
DR 7-106 (B) In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall
disclose:
(1) Legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to him to be directly adverse to the position
of his client and which is not disclosed by opposing
counsel.
The Supreme Court of California decided in Shaeffer v. State
Bar,89 that unless an attorney evidenced an intent to mislead a judge,
he was not subject to disciplinary action when he failed to disclose
a prior case in which he appeared as counsel and in which the hold-
ing was adverse to his position in a subsequent case. The supreme
court held that there was no evidence of the attorney's intent to mis-
lead, and opposing counsel did, after all, cite the adverse authority.
The court seemed to indicate that in all fairness Shaeffer, intimately
familiar with the case in question, should have revealed the case.
90
Nevertheless, he could rely on opposing counsel to bring it up as
long as he did not intend to mislead the trial court. It did not matter
that Shaeffer intended to distinguish the case.
California reaches the intended effect of the ABA Disciplinary
Rule by construing the statutory duty of an attorney "[N] ever to
seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law."'" No attorney can seek to mislead the
court, even by omission. It is the duty of every attorney, civil or
criminal, to deal with the law as it actually is. He can then make
89 26 Cal. 2d 739, 160 P.2d 825 (1945).
90 Id. at 748, 160 P.2d at 829.
91 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(d) (West 1962).
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arguments for change or he can distinguish the authorities which go
against him.
RECOMMENDATION: Though California's case law seems to
prohibit misrepresentation of the law by omission, its Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct deal only with active misrepresentation. One Rule
prohibits an attorney from intentionally misquoting to the jury any
statements, arguments or the contents of documents; it also pro-
hibits the attorney from knowingly citing any overruled decision or
a statute which has been repealed or declared unconstitutional."
Nor may the attorney intentionally misquote to any judge or judicial
officer the language of a book, statute or decision.9" Disciplinary
Rule 7-106 (B) (1), dealing with the failure to disclose authorities
known to counsel, is the perfect complement to the California Rule.
DR 7-106 (B) (1) should be adopted as an amendment to Rule of
Professional Conduct 17.
DR 7-106 (B) [In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer
shall disclose:]
(2) Unless privileged or irrelevant, the identities of the
clients he represents and of the persons who em-
ployed him.
There is little or no authority in California on the subject under
consideration. An 1869 decision of the supreme court placed Cal-
ifornia among those jurisdictions which do not consider the identity
of the client a matter of privilege.94 In that case, the court held that
there was no error in admitting an attorney's testimony as to the
identity of his client. The court did not hold that any duty arose by
virtue of the attorney's status, but rather that he was under the same
obligations as other witnesses-to testify truthfully.
In appearances before public officers or bodies, a California
Rule of Professional Conduct requires that an attorney disclose that
he is indeed an attorney, but he need not reveal the identities of the
parties he represents.95
RECOMMENDATION: In cases where California does not view
the identity of a client or employer as privileged, a judge may order
an attorney to reveal them. Beyond that, there is no apparent reason
to impose the threat of disciplinary action by the State Bar or the
state supreme court. Even the mild sanction of private admonish-
92 Id. § 6076 (Rule 17).
93 Id.
94 Satterlee v. Bliss, 36 Cal. 489 (1869).
95 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076 (Rule 14) (West 1962).
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ment seems improper in a case where an attorney merely fails to
voluntarily disclose the identities of his clients and employers. If the
ABA Rule were in effect, it should be presumed that the identity of
the client is privileged or irrelevant until shown to be otherwise.
DR 7-106 (C) [In appearing in his professional capacity before
a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:]
(1) State or allude to any matter that he has no reason-
able basis to believe is relevant to the case or that
will not be supported by admissible evidence.
(2) Ask any question that he has no reasonable basis to
believe is relevant to the case and that is intended
to degrade a witness or other person.
(3) Assert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue,
except when testifying as a witness.
(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a
cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as to the
culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or
innocence of the accused; but he may argue, on his
analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclu-
sion with respect to the matters herein.
(5) Fail to comply with known local customs of courtesy
or practice of the bar or a particular tribunal with-
out giving to opposing counsel timely notice of his
intent not to comply.
(6) Engage in undignified or discourteous conduct
which is degrading to a tribunal.
(7) Intentionally or habitually violate any established
rule of procedure or of evidence.
California has not decided every issue presented by the various
subdivisions of DR 7-106 (C). Taken as a whole this section, in
the words of the Ethical Considerations which interpret Canon 7, is
a compilation of "certain concepts of proper professional conduct
which have become rules of law applicable to the adversary ad-
judicative process.""0 These rules are designed to give the force of
law to long standing customs which have been developed to insure
the impartial and speedy administration of justice. They are de-
signed to set out the exact framework in which lawyers are free to
operate in pursuit of their clients' objectives.
96 ABA CODE, EC 7-20, at 81.
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The thrust of these rules is again to insure that the lawyer
clearly understands that he must use established procedures to
attain his clients' objectives. Any allusion or opinion on his part
must be foreseeably supported by evidence which he will introduce.
Such opinions are properly withheld until the trier of fact has seen
and heard that evidence. The prohibited activities within the scope
of this section are practices which tend to subvert the adversary
system, and as such they tend to degrade the entire legal profession.
RECOMMENDATION: The purpose of this section in proscribing
activities which tend to undermine the adversary system is effected
in California through the broad provisions by which it enforces the
attorney's oath, his duty to maintain only those actions which
appear to him just, his duty to refrain from offensive personality
and his duty to maintain the respect due courts and judicial officers.
California disciplinary authorities can also punish any act involving
moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption. With these provisions,
California is able to enforce the long-standing customs of practice
which the ABA Disciplinary Rule is designed to effect. Nevertheless,
the State Bar should adopt this section of the Code because it pro-
vides a clear expression of the expected trial conduct of the respon-
sible professional. The legal process can protect the rights of all
parties only if all officers of the court are determined to observe
the formalities of evidence and procedure.
DR 7-107 Trial Publicity. 97
DR 7-107 sets out a detailed list of disciplinary provisionsprescribing those matters which a lawyer may disclose and those he
may not disclose at various stages of the trial, when there is a reason-
able possibility that such information will be disseminated through
the public communications media. These provisions are so detailed
and extensive that space will not even permit them to be printed
here. The importance and sensitivity of the area of trial publicity
are so great that it cannot be adequately treated in this Comment.
Without question a major problem exists where any occurrence
-especially a spectacular trial-may be instantaneously trans-
mitted, amplified, received and interpreted by the public without
reference to the surroundings (and therefore in a sense the truth)
of the report. This problem is the responsibility not only of the pro-
fession, but of the government authorities, the writers and broad-
casters, and every person who is a potential juror. The magnitude
of the difficulty and the inadequacy of present solutions-even
within the profession-are manifest."
07 ABA CODE at 88-91.
98 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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At least some members of the California Bar recognize the need
for reform in this area.99 The difficulty of defining for the lawyer
his responsibility with respect to trial publicity is only a small part
of the dilemma, but a significant one. Because of the intricacy of the
problem, few universal rules can be set down ahead of time. Just
what may an attorney say about the case before or during trial? To
whom may he say it? And what kind of discipline should be imposed
if he fails to obey these rules?
These and other related problems have been the subject of
study by various groups of lawyers around the country.
100 The solu-
tion posed by the ABA Code is to permit the lawyers to report only
matters of official record, and the procedural steps taken so far in
the trial. By excluding all comment on the merits and speculation
on the future of the trial, the Code attempts to establish a standard
which will insure maximum protection to the accused. It leaves
relatively little discretion to the attorney, strictly limiting those
things which he may report.
California law on the matter is somewhat nebulous and in a
state of change. Again, a detailed study of state rules relating to trial
publicity is impossible in the context of the present study. Suffice
it to say that California comes nowhere near the detail, organization
and stringency of the ABA rules. Some improvement in the Califor-
nia law on trial publicity is definitely indicated. Whether DR 7-107
of the ABA Code provides the model for this reform cannot be
properly evaluated in this Comment.
As with other Disciplinary Rules not covered here, DR 7-107
should be studied in detail and its provisions evaluated. Possibly it
could serve as a foundation for revision of California law relating
to trial publicity.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has considered the Disciplinary Rules of Canon
7, which defines the duties of a lawyer in his capacity as representa-
tive of his client. The Disciplinary Rules have been evaluated, com-
pared with the ethical standards now applied in California and a
recommendation made as to the use California should make of each
Rule. Although perhaps the most significant, Canon 7 is only one of
nine Canons in the ABA Code, each with its own Disciplinary Rules
and Ethical Considerations.
99 See, e.g., Maine v. Superior Ct., 68 Cal. 2d 375, 438 P.2d 372, 66 Cal. Rptr.
724 (1968) ; 5 SANTA CLARA LAW. 107 (1965).
100 See ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (1966).
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Each of the Canons deserves exhaustive study and analysis.The ABA Code is the result of five years of work by a very dis-
tinguished Committee of American lawyers; it is the most original,
complete and contemporary study of the lawyer's responsibilities
available. The Code should serve as the foundation for further law
review comments, articles for legal journals, papers, discussions and
action by bar associations across the country. These inquiries should
be the catalyst in a process of re-evaluating and modernizing the fre-
quently unwieldy and incomplete provisions of statutes and rules
governing the conduct of attorneys. Unlike the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, this new Code lends itself to practical application in
the form of Disciplinary Rules capable of enforcement by the gov-
erning body of any bar association.
Whether imposed by statute, bar association rules or less formal
means, ethical standards serve an important function in the legal
profession. The lawyer's position of trust demands a high degree of
responsibility and a strong intrinsic moral sense. Promulgation ofhigh professional standards is of prime importance if the legal pro-
fession is to maintain a position of respect. Every member of theprofession has a duty to develop his own moral standards; study
and adoption of rules and recommendations for professional stan-
dards go far to help the attorney to increase and structure his own
understanding of his professional obligations.
Certainly California should "commend" the new ABA Code to
members of the State Bar, as it did the old Canons of Professional
Ethics. But beyond this, the legislature and State Bar Association
should consider the Code in detail to determine what improvements
could be made in California's professional standards. The Code is
such a valuable source of thought on professional responsibility that
failure to study it closely would be a great waste. Individual lawyers
should also be encouraged to evaluate the Code on their own, and
come to their own conclusions about the value of its provisions.
On January 1, 1970, the new Code will "go into effect." Butprecisely what effect it will have on California's legal profession de-
pends on the use California decides to make of it. Properly used,
the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility can be a significant
tool in the continual re-shaping of the profession to resemble more
closely the ideal of an "honorable, and deservingly honored" part of
the judicial system.
Anthony C. Bennetti
Roger I. Marzulla
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